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TAKING ISSUE WITH TAKINGS: HAS THE
WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT
GONE TOO FAR?
AbstracL The Washington State Supreme Court has expressed concern for local govern-
ments' potential financial liability under the taking clauses of the federal and state consti-
tutions. Accordingly, the court adopted a comprehensive framework to analyze
regulatory challenges and mitigate the chilling effect of potential financial liability. The
court, however, went too far in its zeal to promote innovative land-use measures. Its
broadly inclusive insulation doctrine allows little room for any regulatory takings.
Because the insulation doctrine fails to meet a federal minimum of constitutionality, the
doctrine must be relaxed to comport with precedent. To prevent the return of the chilling
effect, the court must make substantive and procedural changes to state taking law to
provide for an identification of the interests protected by the taking clause and an expe-
dited review process for taking claims.
The United States Supreme Court has limited the regulatory
authority of land-use planners under the taking clause to the United
States Constitution.1 The Court has indicated in two of its opinions
that excessive use of the police power to curtail landowners' use of
their land must end.2 One case heightened the standard for judicial
review of regulations on land use.3 The second case offered a most
effective limitation on regulations, however, adopting a self-executing
compensation remedy for all regulations deemed takings. ' This threat
of financial liability discourages regulatory authorities from innova-
tively addressing the most pressing land-use problems.
Intensifying the threat of liability is the uncertainty surrounding the
application of the taking clause. Two divergent lines of authority gov-
ern the application of the taking clause to regulations: one exempts all
1. The taking clause of the United States Constitution provides: "[N]or shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Similarly, the
taking clause of the Washington State Constitution provides: "No private property shall be
taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having been first made
.... " WA. CONST. art. I, § 16. In the context of police power regulation, Washington case law
has attached no significance to the inclusion of the words "or damaged" to the clause in the
Washington State Constitution. Settle, Regulatory Taking Doctrine in Washington: Now You See
It, Now You Don't, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. Rav. 339, 344 (1989). This Comment assumes the
federal and the state taking clauses are coterminous for purposes of regulatory taking analysis.
2. Berger, The Supreme Court Lays Down the Law (Land Use Style), in 1989 ZONING AND
PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK 200-01 (M. Dennison ed.) (discussing First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) and Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)).
3. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3; see Berger, supra note 2, at 202.
4. First English, 482 U.S. at 315.
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exercises of police power from taking challenges; the other recognizes
that some exercises of police power go too far and constitute takings.'
The Washington Supreme Court recognized the problem created by
the threat of financial liability and the uncertain applicability of the
taking clause. In Presbytery of Seattle v. King County,6 the court
announced a comprehensive framework to analyze land-use regula-
tions under the due process clause and the taking clause.7 The court
identified the critical inquiry as determining when the taking clause
applies.8 By severely restricting the applicability of the taking clause
to regulatory challenges, the court substantially removed the threat of
financial liability and the uncertainty of application.
The Presbytery court insulated a broad category of regulations from
taking analysis, and thus signalled the end of regulatory takings in
Washington. Although the court's goal of encouraging novel
approaches to sensitive land-use problems is commendable, the court's
analysis fails to comport with federal precedent. The court claims its
comprehensive framework reconciles divergent lines of federal author-
ity, but it merely exalts one at the expense of the other. The court's
failure to incorporate both lines of federal authority into its framework
makes the required analysis constitutionally suspect. Until the
Supreme Court of the United States adopts one line of authority, the
Washington Supreme Court must moderate its insulation doctrine and
consider substantive and procedural changes to its regulatory taking
analysis.
I. INSULATION FROM THE CHILL: WASHINGTON'S
SOLUTION TO THE CONFUSION IN FEDERAL
TAKING DOCTRINE
A. Presbytery of Seattle v. King County
In Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, approximately one-third of
the Presbytery's land contained a wetland subject to a restrictive wet-
land ordinance.9 The ordinance prohibited construction within wet-
5. Much confusion surrounds the grammatical use of "takings." This Comment uses
"takings" to refer to the general concept, and "taking" as a specific incident or as an adjective in
a phrase, e.g., federal taking doctrine.
6. 114 Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 284 (1990).
7. The due process clause of the United States Constitution applies to the states through the
fourteenth amendment, which provides in part: "No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
8. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329, 787 P.2d at 912.
9. Id. at 325, 787 P.2d at 910.
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land boundaries and created a buffer zone surrounding the wetland. 1°
The Presbytery challenged the ordinance as a taking after its consult-
ant concluded that the ordinance restricted the use of three or four of
its five lots to open space.11 Although the court ultimately denied the
Presbytery's claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the
court set forth a framework for evaluating constitutional challenges to
land-use regulations.12
The framework begins with a two-step threshold inquiry to deter-
mine whether the taking clause or the due process clause is the proper
medium of analysis. 13 As a first step, courts must ascertain the pre-
dominant goal of the regulations. 4 If the predominant goal is to pro-
tect "the public interest in health, safety, the environment or the fiscal
integrity of an area," then analysis proceeds to the second step of the
threshold inquiry.' 5 If, however, the predominant goal goes "beyond
preventing a public harm" and enhances "a publicly owned right in
property,"16 taking analysis applies. 17
In the second step, courts must determine whether the regulations
"destroy[ ] one or more of the fundamental attributes of ownership-
the right to possess, to exclude others and to dispose of property."' 8 If
the regulations predominantly protect a public interest in health,
safety, the environment, or fiscal integrity and do not destroy a funda-
mental attribute of ownership, taking analysis does not apply. Instead,
courts will evaluate the regulations under the strictures of due pro-
cess.' 9 Regulations that destroy a fundamental attribute of ownership,
however, are subject to taking analysis.20
The Washington Supreme Court's taking analysis involves a multi-
layered inquiry. Regulations that fail to "substantially advance legiti-
mate state interests" are takings.2' Challenges to regulations that fur-
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 326-27, 787 P.2d at 910-11.
13. Id. at 329, 787 P.2d at 912.
14. Id at 329 n.13, 787 P.2d at 912 n.13.
15. Id. at 329, 787 P.2d at 912. This evaluation is referred to as the prevention of harm factor
throughout this Comment.
16. Id. Enhancement of a publicly owned right in property and conferral of benefit are used
interchangeably throughout this Comment.
17. Id. at 333, 787 P.2d at 914.
18. Id. at 329-30, 787 P.2d at 912.
19. The court utilizes a three prong due process test: (1) whether the regulation aims at
achieving a legitimate public purpose; (2) whether the regulation uses means reasonably
necessary to achieve its purpose; and (3) whether the regulation is unduly oppressive on the
landowner. Id. at 330, 787 P.2d at 913.
20. Id. at 333, 787 P.2d at 914.
21. Id.
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ther a legitimate state interest are then divided into facial challenges
and challenges of regulations as applied to a specific parcel of land.22
Under a facial challenge, a regulation constitutes a taking if the land-
owner shows that it denies all economically viable use of any parcel of
regulated property.23 Under a challenge to a regulation as applied, the
court must balance the economic impact of the regulation on the prop-
erty, the regulation's interference with investment-backed expectation,
and the character of the government action.24
B. The Threshold Inquiry: Removing the Chilling Effect
The Presbytery court narrowly tailored the application of taking
analysis to assist local governments in addressing sensitive land-use
problems.25 By favoring due process analysis, the court removed the
intimidating presence of possible financial liability from regulations
protective of health, safety, the environment, and fiscal integrity. The
threshold inquiry and the class of regulations it insulates define the
maneuvering room of the legislative body for sensitive land-use
decisions.26
C. The Federal Taking Context
1. The Specter of Financial Liability
In defining when taking analysis applies, the threshold inquiry
responds to a federal taking doctrine that has become increasingly
onerous for regulators. In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. Los Angeles,27 the Supreme Court not only held that the taking
clause requires a self-executing compensation remedy,2  but also
lengthened the period for which compensation is awarded.29 Rather
than requiring compensation from the day a court finds a regulation a
taking, the First English Court required that compensation be calcu-
22. Id.
23. Id. at 333-34, 787 P.2d at 914.
24. Id. at 335-36, 787 P.2d at 915.
25. Id. at 332-33, 787 P.2d at 913-14.
26. This Comment addresses only the threshold inquiry of the analytical framework
developed by the Washington Supreme Court.
27. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, recognized the effect of
the decision on regulating authorities: "We realize that even our present holding will
undoubtedly lessen to some extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners and governing
bodies of municipal corporations when enacting land-use regulations. But such consequences
necessarily flow from any decision upholding a claim of constitutional right .... " Id. at 321.
28. Id. at 315-16.
29. Id. at 320.
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lated from the day the regulation effected a taking.3° In addition, the
Court created the possibility of a "temporary taking" requiring com-
pensation for the period between enactment and invalidation.31
The threat of financial liability for regulations later deemed takings
encourages regulating authorities to adopt tried and true regulations,
rather than to create innovative solutions to pressing land-use needs.
Contributing to the threat of financial liability is the uncertain applica-
bility of the federal taking doctrine. Unless regulators know what con-
stitutes a taking, they will be unable to adopt regulations that pass
constitutional muster. Federal taking doctrine provides little gui-
dance, so regulators are unable to protect constitutional interests of
landowners and cannot avoid financial liability.
2. The Ambiguity in Federal Taking Doctrine: When Does the
Police Power Go Too Far?
By determining when the taking clause applies to a regulatory chal-
lenge, the threshold inquiry addresses the ambiguity in federal taking
doctrine. Federal case law presents divergent lines of authority for the
analysis of regulatory takings.
a. Physical Takings: The Mainstay of Taking Doctrine
At one time, the government's permanent physical invasion of an
individual's land was the only basis for a taking.32 Although courts
have broadened takings' categories, physical takings remain a stable
part of taking law. Courts have consistently recognized a taking when
the government permanently occupies a person's property.33
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.34 illustrates the
physical taking doctrine. In this case, the State of New York enacted
legislation prohibiting a landlord from interfering with cable television
installation.35 In effect, the legislation permitted installation of cable
boxes and lines over a landlord's objections. The Supreme Court held
that the law constituted a taking of the landlord's property, basing the
analysis on a permanent physical occupation theory.36
30. Id. at 320-21. Most often this will be the day of enactment. The period for which
compensation is calculated, however, does not include normal delays for building permits,
variances and similar administrative proceedings. Id. at 321.
31. Id. at 318.
32. See Northern Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1879).
33. See, eg., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982).
34. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
35. Id. at 423.
36. Id. at 441.
549
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The permanent physical occupation theory requires compensation
when the government occupies part or all of an individual's land, effec-
tively destroying the fundamental ownership right of exclusive posses-
sion.37 According to the Court, proof of such a taking simply requires
evidence that the government allowed placement of a fixture on the
land.3" The extent of the occupation was relevant only to determine
the required compensation. 39 Because the statute allowed the cable
company to go upon the landlord's land and permanently install cable
fixtures, an action amounting to a permanent physical occupation, the
action constituted a taking.4
b. Mugler v. Kansas: The Police Power Exclusion
By limiting takings to physical occupations, courts traditionally
focused on the kind of government action subject to a taking claim.4"
Restrictions on the use of land required analysis only under the due
process clause, which governs the bounds of valid exercises of police
power.42 These cases suggested a state's exercise of police power could
never amount to a taking, unless it involved physical appropriations of
private property by the government.43
The Supreme Court in Mugler v. Kansas refused to deem a govern-
ment regulation a taking.' In this case, a brewery owner challenged
the constitutionality of a prohibition on the manufacture and sale of
alcoholic beverages.45 Because the regulation essentially rendered his
property valueless, the brewery owner asserted the regulation was a
taking of his property without just compensation. 46  The Court
rejected his contention, holding taking clause principles inapplicable
to police power actions.47 The Court reasoned that citizens hold prop-
erty with an implicit condition that any use of the property may not
injure the community.4 Thus, restrictions on uses violating this
implied condition do not represent takings. 49 The legislature had
37. Id. at 435.
38. Id. at 437.
39. Id. at 437-38.
40. Id. at 438. The Court explicitly restricted its holding to physical occupations, refusing to
extend any application of its opinion to restrictions on the use of property. Id. at 441.
41. See, e.g., id. at 427-30.
42. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
43. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text (discussing physical takings).
44. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69.
45. Id. at 664.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 665.
49. Id. at 668-69.
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found that alcoholic beverages injured the health and morals of the
community and had not physically appropriated the brewery.50 The
state could deny Mugler use of his brewery without payment."1
c. The Too Far Test Extends Takings to Regulations
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon52 created the regulatory taking
doctrine, limiting, but not overruling, Mugler's outright exclusion of
police power actions from the taking clause. Justice Holmes' analysis
in Mahon changed the focus of taking analysis from the type of gov-
ernment action to the degree of governmental interference with private
property.
In Mahon, the Pennsylvania Coal Company challenged a legislative
act, which prohibited mining that caused subsidence, as a taking. 3
The statute effectively destroyed the company's property right to
extract coal, because mining without subsidence was virtually impossi-
ble.5 4 In analyzing the statute, the Court recognized that certain legis-
lative acts were proper exercises of police power.55 The government
could justify some infringements on a private property right because of
an "average reciprocity of advantage"-as a member of society, the
owner benefited from valid regulations on land. 6
The Court did not, however, suggest that exercises of police power
are exempt from taking analysis. Instead, it suggested the taking
clause as a necessary counter to the natural tendency of government to
acquire private property. 57 In perhaps the most famous phrase in tak-
ing law, Justice Holmes proclaimed, "while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking."51 8 Finding only a limited public interest represented in the
legislative act and great interference with a private property right, the
50. Id. at 668.
51. Several subsequent cases upheld the Mugler Court's distinction between police power
actions and physical appropriations. Eg., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (upholding an
ordinance that required the plaintiff to cut down ornamental cedar trees carrying a parasite
dangerous to surrounding apple orchards as a valid exercise of police power and not a taking);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding a regulation that prohibited a brickyard
in a residential area as a valid exercise of police power and not a taking).
52. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
53. Id. at 412-13.
54. Id. at 413.
55. Id. at 415.
56. Id.
57. Id. ("When this seemingly absolute protection [of the fifth amendment] is found to be
qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification
more and more until at last private property disappears.").
58. Id.
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Court held the statute a taking of private property without just
compensation. 9
d. Modern Accommodation of Mugler and Mahon: The Public
Nuisance Exception
The Mugler police power exemption and the Mahon too far test
have coexisted uneasily. At times, the Court has based its holdings on
a Mugler exclusion.' In other cases, the Mahon too far test has pre-
vailed.6' Discussions in several recent opinions suggest a precarious
compromise of the two fundamentally conflicting lines of analysis in a
nuisance exception to the taking clause.
The nuisance exception suggests that exercises of police power to
abate a nuisance-like activity never amount to a taking. 62 Two theo-
ries underlie the nuisance exception. First, property ownership in
society is subject to restrictions on use. Second, the social benefit land-
owners enjoy from restrictions placed on others enable them to over-
come the burden of the nuisance regulation.63
The first theory excludes nuisance regulations from the taking
clause because the property owner suffers no unbearable harm, but
rather enjoys an average reciprocity of advantage.' 4 The second the-
ory finds the taking clause inapplicable because nothing is taken. The
owner's property rights never included a right to nuisance-like activ-
ity, thus the government took away no rights by its abatement of the
activity.65
Although alluded to in Mahon, the nuisance exception was first
mentioned in Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York.66 Justice Rehnquist suggested
that the government need not compensate a landowner for a diminu-
tion in value when it prevents the owner from using property to injure
others.67 Although the exception does not exclude all exercises of
59. Interestingly, the remedy in this case was not just compensation, but reversal of an
injunction granted to the surface owners under the legislative act prohibiting mining. Id. at 412.
60. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
61. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); San Diego Gas &
Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 636 & n.61 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987). For a
full discussion of the nuisance exception, see Connors, Back to the Future: The "Nuisance
Exception" to the Just Compensation Clause, 19 CAP. U.L. REV. 139 (1990).
63. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491.
64. Id. (citing Pennsylvania Coal Ass'n v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
65. Id. at 491 n.20.
66. 438 U.S. 104, 145 (1978).
67. Id. at 144.
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police power from the taking clause, it excludes regulations that forbid
uses "dangerous to the safety, health, or welfare of others."6
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,69 the
Court again discussed a nuisance exception, flatly rejecting the conten-
tion that the Mahon too far test overruled the Mugler police power
exception.70 The opinion suggests a niche for Mugler's exemption of
the police power from a taking claim. The Court adopts the Mugler
reasoning to support a nuisance exception, while using Mahon's
emphasis on the state interest and the extent of the infringement to
evaluate the taking claim.
At issue in Keystone was a Pennsylvania statute (Subsidence Act)
prohibiting mining that caused subsidence to public buildings, residen-
tial dwellings, and cemeteries.71 The petitioner, an association of coal
mine operators and affiliates, relied on Mahon to challenge the statute
as a taking of its property right to the mineral estate.72 Initially, the
Court discussed a nuisance exception to the taking clause to validate
the Subsidence Act. The Court found the Subsidence Act protective
of "the public interest in health, the environment, and the fiscal integ-
rity of the area."73 Citing Mugler and its progeny, the Court noted its
hesitancy to find a taking because the statute restrained a use tanta-
mount to a nuisance.74 The Court discounted Mahon's evaluation of
the statute as an advisory opinion,75 preferring the reasoning of
Mugler.76 Yet, its holding did not rely on a nuisance exception to
exempt nuisance-abating regulations from the taking clause. Instead,
the Court factored the nuisance-like aspects of the case into a balanc-
ing of the interests involved. It held that the taking claim necessarily
68. Id. at 145. Justice Rehnquist found the statute at issue did not abate a nuisance and,
therefore, the exception did not apply.
69. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
70. Id. at 490.
71. Id. at 476.
72. Id. at 474. The mineral estate is an estate in land recognized in Pennsylvania. The
mineral estate is severed from the surface estate. The holder of the mineral estate has the right to
mine the coal and additional rights necessary to extract and remove the coal. Additionally, the
holder acquires a waiver of any claims for damages arising from the removal of the coal. Id at
478.
73. Id. at 488.
74. Id. at 491.
75. Id. at 484. Although the critical "too far" language falls in the portion of the opinion the
Keystone Court labels "advisory," similar language occurs in the critical portion of the opinion:
"One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it
reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent
domain and compensation to sustain the act." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
413 (1922).
76. Keystone, 470 U.S. at 488-92.
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failed because the public interest in preventing uses "similar to public
nuisances" was substantial and the association did not show a signifi-
cant enough deprivation.77
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles,78 the Court again implied the validity of a nuisance exception.
At issue was an ordinance prohibiting construction in a flood plain
area.79 Although it remanded the case to resolve another issue, the
Court suggested that the state's authority to enact safety regulations
could "insulate" the ordinance from a taking claim on remand, even if
it denied the owner all use."° In no case, however, has the Supreme
Court explicitly defined and applied the nuisance exception. The nui-
sance exception, the Mugler police power exclusion, and the Mahon
too far test all remain valid tests for takings. Their applicability
depends on the facts of each individual case.
D. Assembling the Pieces: The Doctrinal Bases for the Threshold
Inquiry
Drawing upon commentary, federal doctrine, and Washington case
law, the Washington Supreme Court in Presbytery responded to the
lack of predictability by forging a new framework of analysis that
seeks to reconcile the divergent lines of federal authority.
1. Orion II's Insulation Doctrine and Its Roots in the Nuisance
Exception
The prevention of harm factor in the first step of Presbytery's thresh-
old inquiry is a refinement of the "insulation doctrine" adopted by the
Washington Supreme Court in Orion Corp. v. Washington.8  Finding
support in Keystone and First English for a nuisance exception to the
taking clause, the Orion I1 court insulated from takings any regulation
77. Id. at 492-93.
78. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
79. Id. at 307.
80. Id. at 313:
We accordingly have no occasion to decide whether the ordinance at issue actually denied
appellant all use of its property or whether the county might avoid the conclusion that a
compensable taking had occurred by establishing that denial of all use was insulated as a
part of the State's authority to enact safety regulations.
81. 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988) (Orion H)
(Orion 1I was preceeded by a 1985 decision in which the court held that requiring the Orion
Corporation to seek permits under the exhaustion of remedies rule would be futile. Orion Corp.
v. Washington, 103 Wash. 2d 441, 693 P.2d 1369 (1985) (Orion I)).
554
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that safeguarded "the public interest in health, the environment, and
the fiscal integrity of the area."
82
In Orion I, a tideland property owner challenged the Shoreline
Management Act (SMA) and Skagit County shoreline regulations as
regulatory takings.83 The Skagit County Shoreline Management
Master Plan (SCSMMP) was the principal land use plan applicable to
the property, limiting allowable uses to non-intensive recreation and
aquaculture by permit.84
The court's application of its insulation doctrine appears in the anal-
ysis of the issues for decision upon remand.85 The first step in the
court's taking analysis determined whether the challenged regulation
was insulated from the taking clause.86 The court found any denial of
use attributed to the SMA and the SCSMMP insulated from takings
because the regulations safeguarded the environment, and the safety
and fiscal integrity of the community.87 The regulated uses were not
deemed nuisances; rather, the court interpreted their effect as harmful
to the environment and safety, thus warranting insulation from tak-
ings.88 By considering the insulation doctrine at the beginning of the
taking analysis and applying the doctrine to general environmental
regulations, the court moved the doctrine a step beyond the federal
doctrine. Unlike the nuisance exception, the insulation doctrine pre-
cludes a broader class of regulations from takings.
2. Limiting the Insulation Doctrine
Presbytery's threshold inquiry accounts for other categories of tak-
ings and limits the insulation doctrine to regulations that do not
destroy a fundamental attribute of ownership and do not confer a ben-
efit. The first step requires taking analysis for regulations that confer a
benefit and "actually enhance[ ] a publicly owned right in property."89
Federal courts have not explicitly adopted a conferral of benefit stan-
82. Id. at 654, 747 P.2d at 1080.
83. Id. at 630, 747 P.2d at 1067.
84. Id. at 628, 747 P.2d at 1066.
85. See id at 659-70, 747 P.2d at 1082-88. The court adopted the federal taking analysis,
after explicating the two-prong approach, but left the insulation doctrine intact.
86. Id. at 659, 747 P.2d at 1082.
87. Id. at 661, 747 P.2d at 1083.
88. Id. at 660, 747 P.2d at 1083.
89. Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 329, 787 P.2d 907, 912, cert.
denied, II1 S. Ct. 284 (1990).
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dard, but support comes from Washington case law and
commentary. 90
In Washington case law, the regulatory taking analysis included an
evaluation of benefits conferred by regulations.9 Regulations enhanc-
ing the value of adjacent government land, directly benefiting a gov-
ernment project, requiring access for public use, or resulting in
government acquisition of an interest in land would amount to takings
for conferring public benefits. 92 Washington cases used the absence of
these factors to negate taking claims. 93
Several commentators have espoused similar theoretical bases for
taking analysis. Generally, they argue for a taking test that limits per-
missible exercises of police power to prevention of harm; regulations
that go beyond the prevention of harm and benefit the state amount to
takings.94 Although critics believe the theoretical bases for such a test
are sound, they note problems applying the standard to the bulk of
regulations that to some degree both confer a benefit and prevent
harm. 95
One commentator argues for a narrow construction of the conferral
of benefit standard.9 6 This view limits taking analysis to regulations
that directly benefit a use of land in which the government holds inci-
dents of ownership.97 Requiring a direct relationship to a governmen-
tal ownership interest restricts the conferral of benefit question to
benefits of government property that do not benefit society as a
whole. 98 This effectively narrows the class of regulations that benefits
a publicly owned right in property. The test would not encompass
regulations that confer widespread benefits throughout the
community.
The second step requires taking analysis if the regulation destroys a
fundamental attribute of ownership-the right to possess, exclude, or
90. Justice Rehnquist implied support for a conferral of benefit standard in his Penn Central
dissent. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 146 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
91. See, e.g., Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Department of Ecology, 88 Wash. 2d 726, 733, 565
P.2d 1162, 1165 (1977).
92. See id.
93. See, e.g., Rains v. Fisheries, 89 Wash. 2d 740, 746, 575 P.2d 1057, 1060 (1978).
94. See Settle, supra note 1, at 373 & nn.201 & 203 (citing E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER:
PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 546-47 (1904); Sax, Takings, Private Property
and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971)).
95. Id. at 373.
96. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1093
(1980).
97. Id.
98. Id.
556
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dispose.99 Although the United States Supreme Court has not explic-
itly adopted this standard for physical takings, the Washington
Supreme Court draws from commentary that derives this standard
from recent United States Supreme Court decisions.I°0 This step thus
excludes from the insulation doctrine regulations that effect physical
invasions upon the land.
II. THE HEAT IS ON: WASHINGTON GOES TOO FAR
In Presbytery, the Washington Supreme Court built upon notions
suggested by the United States Supreme Court in Keystone and First
English, but went far beyond the Court's suggestions in the develop-
ment of its threshold inquiry. Striving to eliminate the compensation
remedy's chilling effect on innovative land-use regulation and prefer-
ring substantive due process analysis for land-use regulations, the
Washington Supreme Court effectively foreclosed regulatory takings.
Federal precedent does not support an outright rejection of regulatory
takings. To comport with precedent, the threshold inquiry must
restrict the class of regulations it insulates from the taking clause.
Procedural and substantive changes to taking law, however, will help
prevent the return of the chilling effect.
A. Insulation Doctrine Effectively Forecloses Regulatory Takings
The key factors of the insulation doctrine-health, safety, the envi-
ronment, and fiscal integrity-encompass a wide range of regulations.
Although the Washington Supreme Court provides no specific gui-
dance for construing these factors, the general tone of the Presbytery
opinion makes clear the court's intention to limit severely the number
of regulations subject to taking analysis.101 Few regulations fall
outside the scope of these factors. In Penn Central for example, the
United States Supreme Court characterized an historical landmark
law's purpose as preservation of the historical environment. °2 Simi-
larly, the Washington Supreme Court characterized a shoreline man-
agement act as a safety and health regulation.103
99. Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 330, 787 P.2d 907, 913, cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 284 (1990) (citing Settle, supra note 1, at 356).
100. Settle, supra note 1, at 354-55 & n.96.
101. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 332-33, 787 P.2d at 913-14.
102. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978).
103. See Orion Corp. v. Washington, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 661, 747 P.2d 1062, 1083 (1987)
(Orion II), cerL denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
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B. Stretching Precedent
The United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the fifth
amendment, which is binding on the states through the fourteenth
amendment, assumes a minimum level of protection.,"to The Washing-
ton Supreme Court's analysis must comply with minimum federal
standards to withstand federal review. The present formulation of the
threshold inquiry fails to address previously noted conflicts between
Washington and federal precedents. Moreover, the analysis is based
on questionable interpretations of federal case law.
1. Threshold Inquiry's Conflict With Federal Doctrine
In Orion 11, the Washington Supreme Court noted the conflict
between federal case law and the analysis developed in the Washington
courts.'0 5 Regulatory land use challenges conflicted with federal doc-
trine, so the court utilized federal doctrine to analyze Orion's claim. t"
Whereas Washington's taking analysis could hinge a taking on a con-
ferral of benefit, federal doctrine would require analysis of the eco-
nomic burden the regulation places on the property owner. 10 7 In
refining its Orion 11 analysis, however, the Presbytery court failed to
reconcile this conflict with federal doctrine.
Under the analysis developed in Presbytery, consideration of the
economic burden comes only after a regulation passes the threshold
inquiry."18 Although a regulation deemed to confer a benefit on pub-
licly owned land must pass through taking analysis and cannot in itself
constitute a taking, 109 the lack of economic considerations in the
threshold inquiry prevents a severe economic burden from constitut-
ing a taking in itself. The threshold inquiry thus fails to consider the
Washington court's previous interpretation of federal doctrine.
2. The Insulation Doctrine's Basis: Questionable Interpretations of
Case Law
Although the Washington Supreme Court claims that the insulation
doctrine harmonizes the Mugler police power exception and the
104. Id. at 652, 747 P.2d at 1079.
105. Id. at 657, 747 P.2d at 1081-82.
106. Id., 747 P.2d at 1082.
107. Id.
108. Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 333, 787 P.2d 907, 914, cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 284 (1990); see supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the threshold inquiry.
109. See Orion 11, 109 Wash. 2d at 653, 747 P.2d at 1079 (citing First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 237, 2386-88 (1987)).
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Mahon too far test,110 the doctrine actually exalts Mugler while limit-
ing Mahon's too far analysis to due process considerations. By insulat-
ing most regulations from taking analysis, the court approaches
Mugler's exclusion of police power actions from the taking clause,
without incorporating Mahon's too far limitations.
The Washington Supreme Court found authority for the insulation
doctrine in the attempted reconciliation of Mugler and Mahon in Key-
stone and First English,111 but stretched the authority too far. The
court read Keystone as supporting insulation of regulations that pro-
tect health, the environment, and fiscal integrity.112 Although the
Keystone Court recognized a substantial public interest in preventing
activities that endanger these interests, it did not call for an outright
exclusion of such regulations from taking analysis.113 Rather, the
Court suggested that these interests would carry substantial weight in
a Mahon-style balancing of the public and private interests at stake. 114
The Keystone opinion fostered much confusion by classifying the
interests at stake as "similar to public nuisances,"115 but nowhere does
the opinion call for the insulation of all regulations. Further, the
United States Supreme Court did not base its denial of the taking chal-
lenge on the nuisance exception. Instead, the Court found insufficient
evidence of a diminution in value to establish a taking." 6
The Washington Supreme Court also looked to First English for
support of the insulation doctrine. The court relied on First English as
authority that a regulation that denies all economic use of property
may nevertheless be insulated. "7 The First English Court neither
decided the taking issue nor found the regulation insulated from a tak-
ing challenge. It merely hinted that insulation was a possible basis for
a lower court decision on remand. 118
The author of the majority opinion in First English, Justice Rehn-
quist, argued against preclusion of all regulations from taking analysis
several months earlier in his Keystone dissent. He emphasized that a
110. Id. at 651, 747 P.2d at 1078 (the extent of economic deprivation as a measure of whether
the regulation goes too far is a metaphor for determining the regulation's validity under
substantive due process).
111. Id. at 654, 747 P.2d at 1080.
112. Id. (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488 (1987)).
113. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text (discussing Keystone).
114. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 492.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 493.
117. Orion Corp. v. Washington, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 654, 747 P.2d 1062, 1080 (1987) (Orion
II), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
118. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 313
(1987).
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nuisance exception never applied if the regulation denied all use of the
property.' 19 Justice Rehnquist's statement in First English only pro-
vides equivocal support for the insulation doctrine, and his previous
writing on the issue casts doubt on the existence of federal support. 2 0
C. Do the Limitations Save the Insulation Doctrine?
Despite the tone of the Presbytery opinion, two limitations prevent
the insulation doctrine from precluding all regulations from taking
analysis. Regulations that confer a benefit on a publicly owned prop-
erty right and those that destroy a fundamental attribute of ownership
must undergo taking analysis. But these limitations remain ambigu-
ous and fail to make the insulation doctrine comport with precedent.
Further, the ambiguity undermines the insulation doctrine's removal
of the chilling effect.
1. Enhancement of a Publicly Owned Property Right: An
Ambiguous Standard
The threshold inquiry will not insulate a regulation that enhances a
publicly owned right in property, but the court does not explain the
proper interpretation of this factor.1"' The court suggests that this
question encompasses benefits conferred on the public at the cost of an
individual, where the cost rightly should be spread among society.122
This formulation merely restates the taking issue, rather than defining
the necessary guidelines to determine when regulations unjustly confer
a benefit. Regulations almost always confer a benefit on the public at
the individual's expense. The taking clause, however, governs only
those transfers that unjustly burden landowners.
The court provides little additional guidance as to the proper defini-
tion of conferral of benefit. The court explains an enhancement of a
publicly owned property right as providing the public with use of the
land. 123 This explanation does not clarify the meaning. "Providing
public use" could equate the conferral of benefit with requiring public
119. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
120. See id.
121. This is the second factor in the first step of the threshold inquiry. Presbytery of Seattle
v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 329, 787 P.2d 907, 912, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 284 (1990);
see supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the threshold inquiry.
122. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329 n.13, 787 P.2d at 912 n.13.
123. After explaining the conferral of benefit test as the eminent domain half of a two step
constitutional review, the court noted the test's inconsistency with federal precedent, stating,
"federal takings doctrine precludes us from expressly hinging occurrence of a taking on whether
the invalidated regulation actually provided the public with some use of the land." By inference,
the court equated actual use of land with the conferral of benefit standard. Orion Corp. v
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access. This interpretation, however, would make the first step of the
threshold inquiry redundant with the second step, destruction of a
fundamental attribute of ownership. Requiring public access infringes
on a fundamental attribute of property: the right to exclude others.124
The purpose of the two steps of the threshold inquiry is to analyze -two
separate factors in a taking challenge. The interpretation of the con-
ferral of benefit factor thus remains ambiguous and fails to limit the
insulation doctrine effectively.
2. Fundamental Attributes of Ownership Add to the Ambiguity
The second step limiting the insulation doctrine from excluding reg-
ulations that destroy a fundamental attribute of ownership also
remains ambiguous. The court indicated that such attributes are the
rights to possess, dispose, and deny access. 125 The court adopted these
criteria as a summary of the cases in which the United States Supreme
Court held a taking had occurred. 126 But the Washington Supreme
Court did not explain how to apply these standards to the analysis of a
challenged regulation. The lack of guidance, along with the court's
emphasis on substantive due process analysis, suggests that the court
adopted these standards to reconcile the insulation doctrine with fed-
eral precedent and to provide a means by which the court could retain
some control over regulators.
In Presbytery, however, these standards are not limiting factors. At
most they account for physical takings, a long recognized exception to
the police power rule. The cases cited in support of the conferral of
benefit and destruction of a fundamental attribute of ownership stan-
dards base takings on a physical invasion theory.127 Furthermore, the
limiting factors do not constitute a per se taking test. Unlike federal
analysis, which concludes that a taking occurs along with a physical
invasion, the threshold inquiry requires that these regulations proceed
to a taking analysis.1
28
Washington, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 653, 747 P.2d 1062, 1079 (1987) (Orion II), cert denied, 486
U.S. 1022 (1988).
124. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987); see Presbytery, 114
Wash. 2d at 329-30, 787 P.2d at 912; see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
179-80 (1979).
125. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 330 & n.14, 787 P.2d at 912 & n.14 (citing Settle, supra note
1, at 356).
126. Settle, supra note 1, at 354-56.
127. Id. at 355-56 (citing, among other cases, Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)).
128. Presby(ery, 114 Wash. 2d at 333, 787 P.2d at 914; see supra notes 21-24 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Presbytery taking analysis.
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3. Ambiguity Retains Chilling Effect
By failing to define the limitations on the insulation doctrine but
seeking to remove the chilling effect of an uncertain compensation
remedy, the Washington Supreme Court has placed itself in a precari-
ous position. The court must define the content of the limiting factors
on a case-by-case basis. Once a regulation is deemed a taking because
of either a conferral of benefit or a destruction of a fundamental attri-
bute of ownership, the chilling effect could return. Regulators could
be left wondering whether an innovative land-use measure under con-
sideration will meet a similar fate under the court's analysis. Analyti-
cally, the threshold inquiry then could resemble the troubling too far
test. Without guidance, predictability disappears and the chilling
effect of financial liability returns.
D. Limiting the Insulation Doctrine: Hard Choices
Both Mahon and Presbytery suffer from the same weakness: they fail
to ascertain what property interests, if any, beyond a right to hold
property free from physical invasion by the government, are protected
by the taking clause. The United States Supreme Court has avoided
this dilemma by preferring a case-by-case, fact-intensive determination
of which interests to protect. Washington mirrored this approach by
citing these cases in support of the factors limiting the insulation doc-
trine.'2 9 Until the courts define these interests, taking doctrine will
continue to be unpredictable and onerous for regulators.
The Washington Supreme Court's attempt to define these interests
went beyond precedent. Rather than define the interests protected by
the taking clause, the court suggested few regulations would reach tak-
ing analysis. 3° The court never defined the limiting factors that
would place the remaining few regulations into taking analysis. The
United States Supreme Court has set the boundaries for making this
determination. The interests protected by the taking clause include
holding property free from physical invasion, but fall short of a right
to use property for a nuisance-like activity.13' State courts must now
establish more specifically which interests are included. 1 32
129. See Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 330 & n.14, 787 P.2d at 912 & n.14.
130. Id. at 332-33, 787 P.2d at 914.
131. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); see also
supra notes 62-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the nuisance exception to the taking
clause.
132. Justice Brennan has suggested that this determination is best left to the state courts.
The States should be free to experiment in the implementation of [the taking clause]
provided that their chosen procedures and remedies comport with the fundamental
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This determination will entail hard choices. The court must look to
the values underlying the taking clause, while keeping in mind the goal
of creating a legal environment in which regulators can innovatively
address pressing land-use needs. The taking clause protects the indi-
vidual from singly bearing burdens that should be borne by the public
as a whole.33 A New Jersey state court adopted standards similar to
the nuisance exception: the taking clause protects the landowner's
interest against general regulations that promote aesthetics or broad
environmental concerns, while safety and health regulations protect-
ing the public against an imminent danger fall outside its scope. 134
This approach fails to address adequately the Washington Supreme
Court's concern with favoring innovative land-use regulations, because
few environmental regulations protect imminent dangers to public
health and safety. But the New Jersey decision illustrates the process
the Washington Supreme Court must undergo to clarify the applica-
tion of the taking analysis.
Until the Washington Supreme Court identifies the protected inter-
ests within the bounds drawn by the United States Supreme Court, it
must limit the insulation doctrine to nuisance-like activities. The
United States Supreme Court has offered support for insulating regula-
tions only to the extent of those abating nuisance-like activities. A
nuisance-like standard, however, will not remove the specter of finan-
cial liability overshadowing many innovative responses to pressing
land-use needs. Few environmental or growth-management controls
address the imminent dangers such a standard requires.
E. Expedited Adjudication to Limit Liability
Procedural changes to judicial review of taking claims could lessen
the impact of the uncertainties of substantive taking law.' 35 A speed-
ier, more efficient review process would benefit both regulating author-
constitutional command. The only constitutional requirement is that the landowner must
be able meaningfully to challenge a regulation that allegedly effects a "taking," and recover
just compensation if it does so. He may not be forced to resort to piecemeal litigation or
otherwise unfair procedures in order to receive his due.
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 660 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (citations omitted).
133. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 319
(1987).
134. See Laurjo Constr. Co. v. New Jersey, 228 N.J. Super. 552, 554, 550 A.2d 518, 520
(App. Div. 1988).
135. For a full proposal of procedural changes to regulatory analysis, see Mixon,
Compensation Claims Against Local Governments for Excessive Land-Use Regulations: A Proposal
for More Efficient State Level Adjudication, 20 URB. LAW. 675 (1988).
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ities and landowners. Expedited review of regulatory taking claims
would limit the chilling effect created by the uncertain application of
taking analysis. Because the size of the compensation remedy is
directly related to the length of the period during which the land is
subject to the regulation, limiting the time spent in court would
greatly reduce a local government's liability. 13 6 Similarly, landowners
with time sensitive development plans and financing would benefit
from a shortened period during which their land is subject to the bur-
densome regulation.
Expediting review could be accomplished either through changes to
the judicial review process or creation of an administrative authority
to decide validity and compensation issues.137 The existing judicial
framework could expedite review through prioritization of land-use
claims, appointment of a special panel of judges to hear regulatory
challenges, or the creation of a boutique land-use CoUrt. 13 8 Alterna-
tively, the legislature could create an administrative agency to decide
land-use claims.139 Any adjudicative body would operate under a time
limit for hearing and deciding claims. 1" Additionally, a restrictive
statute of limitations would limit the time in which claimants could
challenge regulations. Although procedural changes do not address
the substantive issues central to taking law, they could provide a
means around the problems caused by the confusion in the substantive
law.
III. CONCLUSION
State courts have struggled with the opposing forces of landowners'
interests and the need for innovative solutions to current land-use
problems. In 1979, the California Supreme Court adopted a well-rea-
soned compromise, limiting the remedy available to landowners in
taking claims to invalidation of the violating regulation. 14' The
United Supreme Court in First English, however, struck down this
approach, requiring compensation for all takings, including temporary
takings. 142
136. Under the current process, litigation often lasts four to ten years. Id. at 685.
137. Id. at 690-700.
138. Id. at 691-92.
139. Id. at 694-95.
140. Id. at 688 (recommending a 90-day limit).
141. Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S.
255 (1980).
142. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987).
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The Washington Supreme Court confronted the issue in Presbytery,
working in the confining milieu created by the First English decision.
The Presbytery court showed that the most effective means for elimi-
nating the chilling effect of the compensation remedy on regulators is
to eliminate regulatory takings. But this solution is too effective.
While the aims of the court are valid, they cannot be pursued at the
expense of the constitutional rights of landowners.
A deteriorating environment, rapid growth, and other pressures on
our limited space point to a need for effective land-use measures. The
current fact-intensive judicial review of regulatory challenges is an
inefficient means of implementing such measures. The courts must
provide both landowners and regulating bodies with guidance as to the
scope of their rights and authority. Defining the interests protected by
the taking clause while providing expedited review of challenges will
solve the problems created by the current process. Adoption of these
means will create room for innovative solutions in the political process
and end regulating the use of land by judicial fiat.
Jill M. Teutsch
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